The Section 3(a) (10) 
I. INTRODUCTION
The Section 3(a)(10) exemption of the Securities Act of 1933 1 ("3(a)(10)") is meant to exempt securities transactions where a fairness hearing by a judge or government agency's ruling replaces usual registration requirements. Recently, there has been a rise in 3(a)(10) financing schemes, where a third party investor, a "3(a)(10) financier," offers to purchase the outstanding debts of a company from its creditors in exchange for discounted, and unregistered, shares of stock. In traditional stock issuances, a company must file a registration statement describing the company's properties and business, the security to be offered, information about the management of the company, and financial statements certified by independent accountants. 2 However, a 3(a)(10) settlement simply requires that an action be brought against a company for "outstanding se-1. Securities Act of 1933 §3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. §77c(a)(10) (2012) ("Except with respect to a security exchanged in a case under title 11, any security which is issued in exchange for one or more bona fide outstanding securities, claims or property interests, or partly in such exchange and partly for cash, where the terms and conditions of such issuance and exchange are approved, after a hearing upon the fairness of such terms and conditions at which all persons to whom it is proposed to issue securities in such exchange shall have the right to appear, by any court, or by any official or agency of the United States, or by any State or Territorial banking or insurance commission or other governmental authority expressly authorized by law to grant such approval."). [Vol. 5:99 curities, claims, or property interests" after which, in a fairness hearing, a judge or agency must accept or reject the terms and conditions of the settlement as "fair" to "all persons to whom it is proposed to issue the securities." 3 Those issuing the securities and those who already own the securities are afforded no such protection.
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This work explores the Section 3(a)(10) exemption in greater detail. Part I discusses the background and history of the 3(a)(10) exemption. Part II introduces the modern trend of 3(a)(10) financing for small public companies. Part III discusses some of the harms of 3(a)(10) financing schemes including who 3(a)(10) financing schemes hurt. Part IV discusses the possible violations of 3(a)(10) financing schemes focusing specifically on (1) pre-settled lawsuits, (2) inequities within the settlement agreements and the probability such inequities will be accurately assessed by the court during a fairness hearing, (3) timing problems related to the fairness hearings, and (4) whether the exchanged shares may be freely tradable afterward without registration or exemption. Part V explores whether the small businesses entering into 3(a)(10) transactions may also be violating securities laws. Finally, Part VI discusses some of the potential actions that could be taken in order to better reflect the legislative intent of Section 3(a) (10) and to stop what is quickly becoming a corrupt practice. Part VI includes two recommendations for the SEC. First, the Commission must develop its guidance materials to include specific regulation about this area. This guidance should comment specifically on the use of 3(a)(10) financing schemes and whether or not, in their view, enforcement actions will be brought during the process and their interpretation of this growing practice. Next, the SEC should bring enforcement actions under Sections 5, 12, and 13 of the Securities Act against both the 3(a)(10) financier and the company for violations related to the practice of 3(a)(10) financing. Finally, it is necessary to gain congressional support to amend the Securities Act to place 3(a)(10) back into Section 4 of the 1933 Act where it was originally written and to add language in an effort to curtail the potentially unscrupulous practice of 3(a)(10) financing.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND EARLY COMMENTARY
In order to promote disclosure, 4 Section 5 of the Securities Act requires that all securities 5 offered or sold 6 in interstate commerce must be subject to an effective registration statement filed with the Securities and 3. See Securities Act of 1933, supra note 1.
4. H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 3 (1933) (President Roosevelt emphasized the importance of disclosure upon saying, "[t]here is . . . an obligation upon us to insist that every issue of new securities . . . shall be accompanied by full publicity and information, and that no essentially important element attending the issue shall be concealed from the buying public.").
5. See Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(1) ("The term 'security' means any note . . . entered into on a national securities exchange relating to"). 6. Id. § 2(a)(3) ("The term 'sale' or 'sell' shall include every contract of sale or disposition of a security or interest in a security, for value.").
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Exchange Commission ("SEC") and issuers must deliver a prospectus to investors unless the transaction is exempted by a specific provision of the Securities Act. 7 Section 3, entitled "Exempted Securities," and Section 4, entitled "Exempted Transactions," provide the exemptions from registration requirements. 89 As it is currently written, the 3(a)(10) exemption exempts:
[A]ny security which is issued in exchange for one or more bona fide outstanding securities, claims or property interests, or partly in such exchange and partly for cash, where the terms and conditions of such issuance and exchange are approved, after a hearing upon the fairness of such terms and conditions at which all persons to whom it is proposed to issue securities in such exchange shall have the right to appear, by any court, or by any official or agency of the United States, or by any State or Territorial banking or insurance commission or other governmental authority expressly authorized by law to grant such approval.
15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10). Section 3(a)(10). The 3(a)(10) exemption is unique in that the disclosure to investors must be deemed "fair" by an objective decision maker rather than disclosing information directly to investors and letting them fend for themselves. Congress noted that "reorganizations carried out without such judicial supervision possess all the dangers implicit in the issuance of new securities and are, therefore, not exempt from the act." 10 A year later in March of 1935, the SEC released a statement saying that the requirement of a fairness hearing is "essential" to the exemption as it is the court who stands in the place of "those who are to receive the securities or to other security holders of the issuer, or . . . the public," and decides whether the provisions of the proposed transaction are unfair. 11 The legislative history of Sections 3 and 4 indicates concern for the reorganization of financially troubled businesses. 12 Nothing in the congressional debates or reports suggest an exemption of mergers and acquisi- 15, 1935) ("This interpretation [that authorities who hold fairness hearings must have express authority of law] seems necessary to give meaning to the express requirement of a hearing upon the fairness of such terms and conditions, which must subsume authority in the supervisory body to pass upon the fairness from the standpoint of the investor, as well as the issuer and consumer, and to disapprove terms and conditions because unfair either to those who are to receive the securities or to other security holders of the issuer, or to the public. This requirement seems the more essential in that the whole justification for the exemption afforded by section 3 (a) (10) is that the examination and approval by the body in question of the fairness of the issue in question is a substitute for the protection afforded to the investor by the information which would otherwise be made available to him through registration.") (emphasis added).
12. H.R. REP. No. 85 (1933) , at 6.
[Vol. 5:99 tions of financially healthy companies, or for litigants who intend to use it to distribute unregistered shares as part of a compromise settlement. 13 PART II: LEFKOWITZ AND THE BIRTH OF 3(A)(10) FINANCING Over its history, the 3(a)(10) exemption has been used for mergers, 14 reorganizations of companies, and settlements of private litigation. Over time, the SEC has issued no-action letters and guidance to interpret its view of when the use of 3(a)(10) is appropriate. 15 Further, the SEC guidance seems to suggest a very broad use of the 3(a)(10) exemption based on the following conditions 16 :
a. The securities must be issued in exchange for securities, claims, or property interests; they cannot be offered for cash. b. A court or authorized governmental entity must approve the fairness of the terms and conditions of the exchange. c. The reviewing court or authorized governmental entity must:
i. find, before approving the transaction, that the terms and conditions of the exchange are fair to those to whom securities will be issued; and ii. be advised before the hearing that the issuer will rely on the Section 3(a)(10) exemption based on the court's or authorized governmental entity's approval of the transaction. d. The court or authorized governmental entity must hold a hearing before approving the fairness of the terms and conditions of the transaction. e. A governmental entity must be expressly authorized by law to hold the hearing, although it is not necessary that the law require the hearing. f. The fairness hearing must be open to everyone to whom securities would be issued in the proposed exchange. g. Adequate notice must be given to all those persons. h. There cannot be any improper impediments to the appearance by those persons at the hearing.
In Lefkowitz, 17 the SEC alleged that private litigation settlements using the 3(a)(10) exemption were for "capital raising," which was an "improper use" of the exemption. 18 The SEC stated in its complaint that Lefkowitz "developed an illegal strategy for penny stock issuers to pay off past due debts while, at the same time, raising additional capital through improper use of 3(a)(10)." 19 The SEC went on to state that "the Section 3(a)(10) exemption is not available where . . . certain terms and conditions of the settlement are not presented to the court for consideration at a fairness hearing; nor is the exemption available for capital raising." 20 According to the SEC, the plan began in 2004, when Unico (the company issuing the stock) issued at least seventeen convertible debentures to Lefkowitz operated companies which allowed the companies to convert the debentures and accrued interest in shares of common stock at fifty percent of the closing bid price. 21 If either party requested the conversion, Unico was required to issue unrestricted shares to the debt holder, either through a transaction pursuant to a registration statement or the application of an exemption from registration. 22 At the time, Unico was a Business Development Company under the Investment Company Act of 1940 ("Company Act") and, as a result, was allowed to issue securities without filing a registration statement pursuant to the exemption from registration provided in Regulation E of the Securities Act. 23 When Unico withdrew its status as a Business Development Company, it no longer could issue unrestricted securities. 24 Lefkowitz was left in a bind as Unico was unable to pay back the debt or convert the debt into shares of common stock. 25 Lefkowitz sought the assistance of a New York City attorney familiar with filing registration statements for penny stock issuers to determine if Unico could file a registration statement with the SEC in order to again issue shares to convert the debentures. 26 The law firm advised Lefkowitz that a registration statement could take at least eighteen months to draft and file, cost a significant amount of money, and may not be declared effective by the SEC. 27 The debentures, which were only six months in length, would surely mature by this time. 28 Lefkowitz and his counsel then discussed the option of potentially filing lawsuits against Unico for failure to "satisfy its obligations" and settling those lawsuits with shares issued under the 3(a)(10) exemption. 29 The law firm introduced Unico to inde- [Vol. 5:99 pendent counsel in Florida to represent Unico in "pre-settled lawsuits" filed by Lefkowitz 30 and 3(a)(10) financing was born.
In a three-year span, more than fifty pre-settled lawsuits were filed under the pretext of settling past-due debts owed by the issuers. 31 For Unico alone less than $4 million in debt was converted into 8,921,335,034 shares, which, at the time they were issued, had a market value of $28,331,307.22. 32 The issuer would execute a settlement agreement with the financier pursuant to an agreement to issue unrestricted common stock to the financier at a substantial discount to the prevailing market price, purportedly to retire the past due debt. 33 The number of settlement shares reflected in the settlement agreement was always based on a negotiated discount of the market price and/or a multiple of the face value of the debt, which, in turn, meant that shares had an actual market value on the date of the settlement agreement which exceeded the amount of the past due debt. 34 Following a fairness hearing, the 3(a)(10) exemption was granted and unrestricted shares were issued to the financier who quickly sold the shares on the open market to public investors unaware of the dilutive effects of the new stock issuances. 35 The financier subsequently remitted monies to the penny stock issuer that, to the SEC, made it "a capital raising transaction." 36 On February 10, 2015, the SEC announced it had settled its civil action against all parties "arising from their respective roles in the illegal unregistered distribution of billions of shares of penny stocks." 37 Private actions involving companies in 3(a)(10) financing arrangements have exemplified the continued complexities of such schemes. 38 Orders granting approval of settlements pursuant to 3(a)(10) show "purchase agreements" of debts made by companies who then quickly file lawsuits in 30 3, 2014) (ruling against a company alleging claims of securities fraud, breach of contract, and tortious bad faith and seeking declaratory relief against a 3(a)(10) financier) with Ironridge Global v. Green Automotive, No. BC526570 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2013) (ruling in favor of a company that completed a settlement agreement with a 3(a)(10) financier. The court awarded a temporary restraining order restricting the ability of the financier to convert their outstanding debt into additional shares per the settlement agreement. In its opposition to a motion enforcing the shares being issued, the company (defendant) claimed that the 3(a)(10) financier (plaintiff) first asked for forty million additional shares, then fifty five million, and then finally six billion shares, six times the authorized capitalization of the company.).
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order to settle for shares. 39 Further, many 8-K and 10-Q/K filings since 2011 describe transactions strikingly similar to Lefkowitz. 40 Though the settlement agreements have different terminologies, many have similar terms and are completed in a similar way to Lefkowitz. 41 In a basic 3(a)(10) arrangement, a 3(a)(10) financier brings a lawsuit against the company that will be receiving the financing. Within the initial lawsuit documents, it is stipulated that the 3(a)(10) financier is to be issued unrestricted common stock pursuant to a reduction in price from the current market value. 42 According to the SEC filings of several companies, millions, 43 and sometimes billions, 44 of shares are issued to the financier in "tranches" which can be requested at any time by the financier as long as the issuance is below either 4.99% 45 or 9.99%. 46 In press releases by companies who work with 3(a)(10) financiers, it is indicated they are using the 3(a)(10) investment for "funding." 47 Further, similar to Lefkowitz, companies are issuing more value in stock than the value of the debt they originally sold to the 3(a)(10) financier. 48 From start to finish, these lawsuits 46. Jammin Java Corp., Corporate Filing (Form 10-Q) (Sept. 15, 2014) ("Additionally, as a result of each Stipulation, we agreed that at no time shall shares of common stock be issued to Ironridge and its affiliates which would result in them owning or controlling more than 9.99% of the Company's outstanding common stock.").
Press Release, Green Automotive Company Closes $500,000 Investment from
Ironridge Global, MARKETWATCH (Dec. 5, 2013 12:00 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/ story/green-automotive-company-closes-500000-investment-from-ironridge-global-2013-12-05 ("The funding will help support the company's rollout" of new products.). [Vol. 5:99 can be filed and settled within one to two days. 49 One 3(a)(10) financier calls this "innovative financing structure" a way to "substantially reduce the transactional costs and time" and become a "long-term financial partner, assisting public companies in financing growth and expansion by supplying innovative funding solutions and flexible capital." 50 III. THE HARMS OF 3(A)(10) FINANCING 3(a)(10) financing is damaging to the companies being financed, the shareholders who owned the stock before the transaction(s), and the marketplace as a whole. According to SEC filings, many companies engaged in 3(a)(10) financing end up issuing between eight and forty times the original number of shares agreed upon in the settlement. 51 This flood of shares in the market could in turn make traditional offerings more difficult as it may cause potential future investors to have reasonable trepidations about investing in a company whose stock price has fallen so precipitously.
The investors who already invested in the company are damaged because their investment is devalued through dilution. Investors holding stock of a company undergoing 3(a)(10) financing will likely see a drop in share price as a result of the number of shares entering the market due to the financing agreement. Unless the company files an 8-K or other document with the SEC, the investor will likely never know the 3(a)(10) settlement happened until after the transaction is completed. Issuers may intentionally withhold information from shareholders in order to keep the stock price from falling. 52 Shareholders who are notified may sell out of their position, not because the company lacks investment potential, but because of the overwhelming number of shares which will be sold and the 
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pressure on the company to create artificial fixes (like a reverse split), which can "renew selling pressure." 53 The marketplace is damaged by 3(a)(10) financing because it artificially devalues the stock. While stock offerings normally indicate success in a company, 54 they are almost always dilutive. 55 It is likely companies accepting 3(a)(10) financing will not be able to absorb the type of dilution of a normal secondary offering, 56 let alone an offering in which the financier can ask for more shares to be issued as the stock price falls. 57 Worse yet, this gives the 3(a)(10) financiers no incentive to hold the stock as a typical investor might. Despite receiving the stock at a discount, 58 holding the stock is less beneficial when selling the stock drops the share price and triggers more issuances.
Bearing in mind that a rational investor would not purchase stock certain to fall in price, and considering that a company's stock price is very likely to fall because of the dilutive nature of 3(a)(10) financing, silence to the market about the deal is key to a 3(a)(10) financier. If the market knew that the purchase of a certain company's stock would trigger the issuance of more shares, thus driving down the price, it is unlikely potential investors would make purchase. Silence about a 3(a)(10) financing agreement allows a 3(a)(10) financier to sell the stock where otherwise there would be no buyer for their discounted shares.
IV. THE POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF 3(A)(10) FINANCING
There are several potential issues presented by 3(a)(10) financing. These issues will be discussed in the order in which a 3(a)(10) financing agreement takes place. The 3(a)(10) financier and the target company enter into an agreement to file a pre-settled lawsuit in order to procure a fairness hearing. 59 Judges in 3(a)(10) financing settlements typically re- 57. See ScripsAmerica, Inc., v. Ironridge Global LLC, 2014 BL 314688 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 03, 2014) at 2 (describing that the settlement agreement between a 3(a)(10) financier and the company stated that if the company's shares fell a certain amount, they were required to issue more shares so that it equaled the final amount of the settlement and that at any time, the 3(a)(10) financier could request the issuance of additional shares subject to a calculation based on the share price on the day before the court verified the fairness of the settlement.). ceive a complaint, a list of the claims for which the 3(a)(10) financier bases the lawsuit, an answer, and sometimes a "Memorandum of Law." 60 The settlement agreement typically allows the 3(a)(10) financier to request more discounted shares of stock as the price goes down and contains an "adjustment mechanism" to determine the exact amount. 61 In a timeframe as short as one to two days, the judge pronounces the settlement transaction agreement "fair" to those who will be receiving the securities (the 3(a)(10) financier). 62 After the agreement, the 3(a)(10) financier sells the securities in the open market, thus diluting the current shareholders value. 63 
A. Pre-Settled Lawsuits
In Lefkowitz, the SEC accused a financier of settling lawsuits "under the pretext" of settling past-due debts, but in actuality the shares exchanged were in "pre-settled" lawsuits. 64 In other words, the exchange of equity for debt relief (the "transaction") was already settled before the 3(a)(10) financier filed the lawsuit against the company. It stretches the bounds of gullibility to believe the financiers in such transactions are not filing the lawsuits for the sole purpose of meeting 3(a)(10)'s requirement that the transaction must be for a "bona fide" claim. 65 While it seems that any justiciable allegation will suffice, 66 there was at least one instance in which the SEC did not provide no-action protection in a 3(a)(10) settlement because the issued securities pertained to a future contract that had not taken place yet. 67 To the SEC, it appeared as though the company had simply signed a bad, more expensive than bargained for, contract and was attempting to use 3(a)(10) to finance the deal. 68 The SEC later said they would not recommend action in regards to the exchange after the company corrected its facts to state that the contract had already caused the company to "default." 69 It can be inferred that while the definition is very place. Thus, on October 11, 2013, Ironridge filed a breach of contract complaint in Los Angeles Superior Court that sought to collect the accounts payable debts; it sued as the successor in interest to Scrips' creditors under receivables purchase agreements into which it had entered with the creditors."). 66. HICKS, supra note 13, at § 3:9 ("Presumably, any justiciable allegation will suffice as long as it relates to an actual injury and thus to an outstanding claim."). 
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broad, the "bona fide" debts required by 3(a)(10), must have caused the sort of financial stress 3(a)(10) was written to relieve. 70 A court may find, in line with the legislative intent, that a claim may not be bona fide if the company would not default but for the 3(a)(10) settlement. Negotiations between the parties before the settlement, indeed before the assignment of the claims, may cut against the fairness requirement of 3(a)(10). Both the SEC and the courts have mostly avoided a definition of "fairness." 71 In discussing the factors to include in "fairness," the court in Blinder took judicial notice of the "adversarial" proceeding stating that " [t] here is nothing to suggest any collusion in the preparation and submission of the agreement." 72 In quoting Blinder, other courts have mentioned how "hotly contested" the settlement agreement was and how "the parties could not even agree on who should participate in the settlement negotiations" when deciding whether it was fair. 73 This is in stark contrast to a 3(a)(10) financing settlement in which the parties are almost never adversarial, let alone at odds; the settlement is introduced by the financier to the target company as a banker pitches a loan. 74 The target company agrees before the debt is even assigned to the 3(a)(10) financier. 75 The financier's "complaint" and the company's "answer" are then manufactured for the fairness hearing. 76 At least one court has stated that it is "clear that Section 3(a)(10) does not provide a mechanism for obtaining a fairness hearing." 77 The "authority must come from somewhere" and the court has inherent authority to 70 . Securities Act Release No. 312, supra note 11 (stating that the "whole justification" for § 3(a)(10) was that "the examination and approval by the body in question of the fairness of the issue in question is a substitute for the protection afforded to the investor by the information which would otherwise be made available to him through registration."). [Vol. 5:99 approve a "settlement of litigation." 78 The court found that it was appropriate to rule on the fairness of the settlement because 3(a)(10) "was intended primarily to offer financially troubled corporations an alternative to the burdens of registration." 79 In 3(a)(10) financing, the company was not looking to avoid the "burdens of registration," but rather was offered an opportunity to alleviate some of its debt by paying off its creditors with its own equity shares. 80 
Bruce Matson, Fairness Requirement in Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities
B. Settlement Agreement
Even if the settlement agreement is provided to the court 81 it may still not provide everything the judge needs to make a decision. For instance, in Lefkowitz, the SEC found that the 3(a)(10) financier was intentionally leaving out the "true value" of the settlement agreement and a side agreement to remit gains from the sale of the stock back to the company. 82 At no point was the presiding judge made aware of the "market value of the settlement shares," much less that the market value of those shares "exceeded the debt being extinguished by multiples." 83 While the court is shown to be aware of the total amount of the claims (through purchase agreements submitted to the court), the court is often not made aware of the value of the shares or the calculation by which they are further distributed after the date of the settlement. 84 As one court put it, "the reviewing court 'must have sufficient information before it to determine the value of both the securities, claims or interests to be surrendered and the securities to be issued in the proposed transaction.' " 85 When reviewing the terms of a 3(a)(10) financing settlement agreement, it is not possible for a judge (or 78. Id. 
Id.
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state agency) to determine the total number of shares or their value because 3(a)(10) financiers are able to request a nearly infinite amount of shares as the share price continues to fall.
C. Time Issues
Even if it were possible for all relevant and useful information to be included in a 3(a)(10) financing settlement agreement, there would still be a question as to the ability of judges in these fairness hearings to properly understand the transaction at hand. It is important to remember that this process is meant to take the place of traditional registration, a process that can take many months. 86 In a 3(a)(10) financing hearing, the court can receive the complaint, the proposed settlement agreement, and the debt claim purchase agreements and approve the settlement agreement in as little as one to two days. 87 Further, some courts in which 3(a)(10) financing hearings often take place hold a "five minute motion calendar," which requires that attorneys make a good faith effort to resolve the issue within five minutes. 88 It has been implied that a statutory analysis shows that this sort of use of 3(a)(10) is improper-that a fairness hearing should go beyond "procedural fairness"-because the 3(a)(10) exemption requires a judicial determination of fairness to assure investor protection. 89 It is extraordinarily unlikely that a court receiving a complaint, answer, and sixty-seven page claim purchase agreement, is able to resolve whether or not the deal is fair (in one or two days) with the same level of scrutiny as would be achieved with registration statements filed with the SEC. 90 In order to properly protect companies and shareholders, a court must look over all material documents and be able to address any issues therein. Two days to review what can be hundreds of pages of documents and a five-minute hearing simply cannot provide the same level of protection as traditional SEC registration.
[Vol. 5:99
D. Are 3(a)(10) Settlement Shares Able to be Freely Traded After a Fairness Hearing Approved the Settlement Agreement?
In a transaction that avoids Section 5 disclosures by relying on the 3(a)(10) exemption, there must be an exchange of a bona fide security. 91 In 1934, Section 3(a)(10) was pulled from Section 4 and placed under Section 3 in what has been coined a "legislative accident" as Section 3 deals with securities exemptions and Section 4 deals with exemptions of transactions. 92 This may be seen as a distinction without a difference, but it speaks to a very serious question as to whether the securities may be freely resold after the transfer. Just two years after the 1934 Act passed, Congress remarked that "[b]y placing these exemptions under section 3 it is made clear that securities entitled to exemption on original issuance retain their exemption; if the issuer is not obliged to register in order to make the original distribution, dealers within a year are subject to no restriction against dealing in the securities." 93 (emphasis added).
In the past the SEC has been inconsistent regarding its position on a financier's ability to resell 3(a)(10) settlement shares. The Commission has issued competing no-action letters: (1) not allowing resale by non-affiliates unless they relied on a separate exemption and did not receive "substantial" shares, 94 (2) declaring that subsequent resale could only be "affectuated pursuant to registration under the Act or suitable exemption" 95 and, (3) most recently, allowing the shares to be resold by the party receiving 91. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. §77c(a)(10) (2012) (noting that a bona fide security exchange is any security which is issued in exchange for one or more bona fide outstanding securities, claims or property interests, or partly in such exchange and partly for cash, where the terms and conditions of such issuance and exchange are approved.). ("While the exemption provided by Section 3(a)(10) of the Act may be available for shares issued in settlement of a claim where the fairness of the settlement has been approved by a Court, it is our view that the transactional exemption provided by that section does not extend to subsequent resales of the securities acquired. Such resales can only be effectuated pursuant to registration under the Act or suitable exemption." Further, even when a subsequent exemption for resale is provide by Section 4(1), the "rationale" of the act should be "interpreted to permit only routine trading transactions as distinguished from distributions. Therefore, a person reselling securities under Section 4(1) of the Act must sell the securities 
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the shares if they were a non-affiliate because the presumptive underwriter rule was amended. 96 Consistently, however, the SEC has advised that non-affiliates receiving shares could resell them as long as they did not receive a "significant number" of shares. 97 By any reasonable standard, 3(a)(10) financiers are receiving a significant number of shares. 98 Most courts have found that there needs to be a separate registration or exemption in order to resell 3(a)(10) securities. In Multicanal the Federal Bankruptcy court analyzed, and eventually remanded to a lower court, the question of whether a section 4(2) exemption was needed to be able to sell the securities received freely after the exchange. 99 In Continental Insurance the court found that "since the statute is designed [for]. . .an unsettled dispute" the court can exercise its jurisdiction to provide a fairness hearing. 100 However, the court "does not believe it to be appropriate 10) is available and that the record is sufficient to include the fairness finding required by that provision. Multicanal also contends that since the securities to be issued to the U.S. retail holders will be covered by the Registration Statement and the securities issued to the 'yes' voting noteholders will be covered by Section 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2), there will be no discrimination, and all of the issued securities will be fungible and freely tradable.").
[Vol. 5:99 to hold that the new securities are not subject to registration." 101 By its reading, the court found that the only requirement of a fairness hearing is that the court approve the "terms and conditions of the exchange," but "an express determination as to the necessity for the registration is more appropriately left to the SEC or any future disputes that may result from the exchange of securities." 102 Most recently, five different defendants in connection to the 3(a)(10) financing scheme in Lefkowitz, were all found to be in violation of Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, which requires public distributions of securities to be conducted pursuant to an effective registration statement filed with the Commission or pursuant to a valid and properly invoked exemption from registration. 103 Most academics are in favor of requiring additional registration or exemptions for resale. The 3(a)(10) exemption is "not based on the nature of the security" and operates "more like a transaction exemption." 104 More than that, "the weight of authority leaves no doubt that 3(a)(10) is and should be a transactional exemption only." 105 The main reason is that the fairness hearing may protect the initial investors who receive the shares, but it does not provide assurance to the secondary purchasers like the protection afforded by a prospectus. 106 The SEC itself has argued that 3(a)(10) financing companies are actually unregistered dealers and are therefore in violation of Section 15(a)(1) of the Exchange Act. 107 A "dealer" is someone who is "engaged in the business of buying and selling securities. . .for a person's own account through a broker or otherwise." 108 While the issue has not been fully ad-judicated, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") did find that there were material facts that are in dispute to overcome a motion for summary disposition. 109 The case turned on whether the 3(a)(10) financier's buying and selling of securities was done as part of regular business. 110 The ALJ found that the definition of dealer "cast a wide net," and that a 3(a)(10) financier could fall under that definition based on the "totality" of a "factspecific endeavor." 111 V. THE DEVIL'S ADVOCATE? HOW MUCH BLAME SHOULD APPROPRIATELY BE PLACED ON THE TARGET COMPANY?
The companies accepting 3(a)(10) financing are taking a big risk. In order to keep current investors apprised of significant corporate events, public companies are required to file a Form 8-K within four business days of a "triggering event." 112 A 3(a)(10) financing scenario can be a triggering event, and there are two items under Form 8-K that must be reported to investors in such a situation: item 1.01 and item 3.02. 113 Under item 1.01, a registrant must disclose within four business days its entry into a material definitive agreement. 114 Under item 3.02, a smaller reporting company 115 must disclose a sale of unregistered securities, within four business days of the sale, unless the securities constitute less than five percent of the shares outstanding in that particular class of securities. 116 According to the SEC, this does not mean five percent at the date of the settlement, but every time the company issues five percent or more in any tranche. 117 In 2014, the SEC filed cease and desist orders against ten companies for a combined twenty two unregistered stock sales of over five percent of total issued and outstanding stock and other violations under Exchange Act rules 13(a) and 12(b). 118 The timeline in the cease and desist orders show that the 3(a)(10) financing companies forced the compa- 
Id.
Changeover to the SEC's New Smaller Reporting Company System, SEC. & EXCH.
COMM'N (Jan. 25, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/smrepcosysguid.pdf (qualifying as "smaller reporting companies, ". . .if they (1) have a common equity public float of less than $75 million or (2) are unable to calculate their public float and have annual revenue of $50 million or less, upon entering the system").
Id.
117. SEC Sanctions, supra note 52.
118. See id. ("According to the orders, the companies entered in a financing agreement pursuant to which [the company] issued shares of stock to the financing company purportedly in reliance on a registration exemption found in section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Act of 1933. The financing agreement provided for obligations that were material and enforceable against [the company].").
[Vol. 5:99 nies to sell between 5% and over 35,000% of their outstanding stock over a period ranging from as little as one week up to several months. 119 In Lefkowitz, the SEC found it compelling that the agreement between the 3(a)(10) financier and the target company was pre-settled. Any time there are two apparent adversaries entering into an agreement, there is an opportunity for fraud. Indeed, beyond not properly keeping investors informed about the 3(a)10) transactions, they were also giving kickbacks to the target company after completing the deal. 120 Criminal charges were filed against the target company for making "false and fictitious statements" in the company's filings with the SEC regarding the 3(a)(10) transactions. 121 VI. SOLUTIONS TO ALLOW 3(A)(10) FINANCING While it has been suggested further safeguards are not necessary in 3(a)(10) transactions because fairness hearings are a good substitute for the registration process, 122 the evidence presented in previous sections indicates a need for additional safeguards to protect the system from 3(a)(10) financing. 3(a)(10) financing clearly does not benefit the target company, the investors holding securities in the target company before the 3(a)(10) transaction, or the market as a whole. For these reasons, the SEC needs to step in to protect investors.
The SEC needs to bring enforcement actions against 3(a)(10) financing companies. 123 3(a)(10) financiers bring pre-settled lawsuits against companies in order to have a fairness hearing where normally the lawsuits re-119. See id. (noting that in one cease and desist order, a company had been forced to sell over seven billon unregistered shares of common stock. The company failed to report the extreme nature of the dilution to shareholders for a little over a month. During this time (according to http://www.otcmarkets.com/stock/COWI/) the company's share price fell from a high of $.001 to $.0001, a 1000% percent fall, from which it had not recovered as of Nov. 6, 2015 (1985 -1986) . ("During the past fifty years, many changes in the securities laws have augmented investor protection in a number of ways. As a result, the registration process has become less important in the overall pattern of investor protection, diminishing the necessity of an interpretive policy favoring registration. In view of these developments, we believe that as a matter of policy there should also be integration safe harbors for offerings made in reliance on section 3(a)(9) or section 3(a)(10) of the Act, since, in such offerings, there is little need for the registration safeguards."). 
